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ABSTRACT

A sampling of classroom approaches for second language teaching included in the book "Methods That Work: A Smorgasbord of Ideas for Language Teachers" is outlined. The methods covered include Total Physical Response, Silent Way, The Natural Approach, several dramatization techniques, and the pragmatic curriculum. It is concluded that these methods work because they require students to link up utterances in the target language with facts that are in some sense fixed or established, or at least imagined or portrayed in film or drama. Pragmatic theory suggests that this linkage will be easier to establish and that texts will be of greater benefit to the students to the extent that the texts are episodically organized, or logically structured and motivated by conflict. (MSE)

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A PREVIEW OF *METHODS THAT WORK**

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Ever since I attended my first TESOL convention fourteen years ago, the annual TESOL meeting has been a highlight of each year. Even in years when I wasn't able to attend the meeting, I looked forward to it. I was like an Egyptian English teacher I met in Cairo who told me in his heavy Arabic accent, "I am looking forward to visiting your country."

I said, "Wonderful! When are you coming?"

In carefully chosen words he replied, "Oh, I will never be able to come. It is too expensive for me, but still I am looking forward to visiting your country."

I'm like that about the TESOL meeting. I still can't afford it, but even in years when prudence overrules my enthusiasm, I look forward to coming and to seeing friends and hearing inspiring talks like the one by Mary Finocchiaro and the ones by the other plenary speakers—not to mention the many concurrent sessions. This year was different thanks to Penny Larson and the other organizers; prudence and enthusiasm were not totally contradictory motives.

In thinking about this talk, I tried to pick a topic that would appeal to you deep down as teachers. Some who are battle-weary may say that I have overreached myself in the choice that I have made, but Browning said that "the reach should exceed the grasp or what's a heaven for" and I have always considered that to be good advice for us teachers so I am going to go ahead in any case to talk about *Methods that Work*. Actually, it's not a topic that I came to suddenly,

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*Although the book was officially published in 1983, it did not in fact get to the bookstores until after the Houston TESOL Convention in March 1984. Therefore, this paper actually did *preview* the book. The text that follows is a slightly abbreviated and edited version of the actual talk presented at the TESOL Convention. I want to thank my co-author and co-editor of the book being previewed, Dr. Patricia Richard-Amato. She in particular called my attention to the quote from L. Jones below and played an important role in all the rest as well. I also want to thank Professor Kun-ok Kim from Seoul, Korea for supplying and checking the Korean utterances in this paper. Of course, I alone must bear responsibility for the present form of the paper.

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and it's more than just a coincidence that Pat Richard-Amato and I have co-edited and co-authored a book by that title.

However, the book isn't just titled, *Methods that Work:* we added the phrase, *A Smorgasbord of Ideas for Language Teachers*. The key word is "smorgasbord." You can pick and choose from the various selections and create your own banquet. Also, you can leave out those items that, for whatever reason, don't appeal to you. I hasten to add that *if* it's a good book, it's because of teachers who have contributed years of work in order to build a solid foundation in classroom experience for each of the thirty-odd contributions.

Today I can only offer the barest sampling of some of the main dishes in the smorgasbord. Using several methods as reference points, however, I want to try to say why it is that some methods work. For most of us, excluding those who may see theory as an end in itself, failure is a topic of low interest. No doubt this is part of the reason that Krashen (1982) astutely observed in his book on *Principles and Practice in Second Language Acquisition* that many teachers have lost confidence in theory. Perhaps this is because theoreticians are too often preoccupied with failure – problems, difficulties, etc. – rather than with success, which they often seem to think is at best unexplainable and at worst unattainable. On the other hand, the question of why some methods work is fundamentally a theoretical question. A very practical one, but a theoretical question nonetheless. Another way of putting it is to ask: What's different about methods that work?

When I was preparing this talk, I found myself trying to heap everything from the whole smorgasbord onto one plate. The trouble was that after twenty pages I hadn't even gotten started. So I have determined to give just a whiff of a few dishes. Some of these will be as familiar to most TESOLers as fried chicken and potato salad, but a couple are more exotic concoctions. By now everyone is familiar with J.J. Asher's *total physical response*, Caleb Gattegno's *silent way*, and most everyone will also know a good deal about the Terrell-Krashen method also known as *the natural approach*. Less familiar, I suppose will be a rag-bag of ideas about *dramatization*, and finally, *a pragmatic curriculum*.

At the outset, I can think of two valid objections to my choices. First, they don't always work, and second, someone may say, "I just don't like them." I want to answer these objections before going on. It's true that the methods to be examined do not work equally well for all teachers nor for all students, and in some cases, they fail miserably. This objection is a valid one, but inapplicable to those cases where the methods in question do generate success. Keep in mind that we are not trying to say why many methods fail, but why some succeed. Moreover, I think we can agree fairly well on what success is. It's getting our students to the point where they can communicate in the target language. At the same time I think we have a fair notion of what failure is. It is something less even though the two may differ by degrees rather than categorically.

The second objection, I think, is equally valid. Some teachers will say, "But that's just not my style." I take this to be a reasonable basis for rejecting any approach to teaching. We teachers need to have the freedom to express our own individuality and to use what works for us. However, the point of discussing the five choices I am going to talk about is not to force anyone into a mold, nor to violate the preferences of any individual teacher. On the contrary, the ultimate respect is paid to such preferences by appreciating them for what they are. At the same time, this will encourage us to examine options which have worked for

some teachers. Although I acknowledge that the few considered here constitute only a small portion of the full range open to all of us, still I think most will agree that the five families of methods I have chosen to examine are worth looking at.

Asher's *Total Physical Response*

Asher's *total physical response* is based on a simple concept. To illustrate the method, let us just do a short lesson in Korean.

(1) [$s^h{}_{\supset}s^hips^hiyo$].

(At this point, I indicated by gesture that everyone should stand up and mildly threatened in Krashen style, "I see some of you still sitting down. [$s^h{}_{\supset}s^hips^hiyo$] or it's pushups on the fingertips.")

(2) [$torass^h{}_{\supset}s^hips^hiyo$].

(I turned around.)

(3) [$an\int\dot{+}s^hips^hiyo$].

(I gestured for people to sit down.)

As students progress in the language, more complex commands can be introduced, and the transition to declaratives, questions, negations, and indeed to longer stretches of discourse can be made without great difficulty.

One of the criticisms that has often been advanced is that Asher's approach is not a total curriculum. It lacks the sort of integration that some of us would like to see. A modified version, which I like, was suggested by Kalivoda, Morain, and Elkins (1971). They advocated using connected sequences of commands instead of disjointed and unrelated sentences. Instead of a sequence such as, "When Maria begins to dance with Juan, Pilar will run to them and hit Juan with her newspaper" (Asher 1979), they recommend a connected sequence of commands such as:

> Open the drawer; take out a knife; place the onion on the table; chop the onion; your eyes are watering; wipe them; add the onion to the stew; pick up the spoon; stir the stew; take a spoonful; blow on it;, taste it; it's good; smack your lips (Oller and Richard-Amato 1983: 338-339).

Kalivoda et al., who have used this approach extensively in three languages claim that it enhances comprehension and enriches the vocabulary and structural diversity acquired by their students.

If I understood him correctly, Asher argued early on that his method worked *because* of the physical activity which accompanied utterances in the target language (see Asher, Kusudo, and de la Torre 1974). From the beginning he advocated a "silent period" during which students would listen, comprehend, demonstrate comprehension through action, but not speak the language. More recently, Asher continues to emphasize the importance of physical activity as a catalyst in the whole approach, but, if I understand his most recent writings, he has adopted a more Krashenian posture – that is, he advocates a *comprehension model* which stresses the linkage of target language utterances with actions carried out by the students.

Gattegno's *Silent Way*

There has been a good deal written about Gattegno's *Silent Way* and I will

not try to give a complete synopsis here. Rather, I will emphasize the aspects of Gattegno's method that I think are most critical to its success in many practical applications. In many ways, the early phases of the approach resemble the TPR approach except for two aspects: where Asher uses commands, Gattegno starts out with declarative statements, and where Asher uses actions to demonstrate meanings, Gattegno relies on realia, in particular a set of colored cuisinaire rods. He starts off with simple naming. He selects a rod from the collection and says, a rod, or the equivalent in the target language: In Korean, for instance, we would say:

> [makt^{+} eki] (where the raised + indicates a fortis consonant; at this point I held up a red rod, then repeated the Korean utterance holding up a yellow one).

The problem is both to comprehend the meaning and to begin immediately to reproduce a recognizable facsimile of the target utterance. This is a formidable task, and Gattegno turns up the heat by being silent. While Asher recommends a "silent period" where the student is not expected to say anything until ready, Gattegno applies pressure through silence and thus communicates at least to some of the students a responsibility to begin immediately to break into the system of the target language with both verbal feet. Gattegno's next step is to elaborate on the utterance form:

> [makt^{+} eki]
> [noranmakt^{+} eki] (holding up the yellow one)
> [p^{+}alganmakt^{+} eki] (holding up the red one).

Gattegno's approach is subject to the criticism that it lacks an elaborated and fully integrated curriculum, but at the hands of skilled instructors, no one can deny that it produces some remarkable gains in language proficiency. Also, early in the recommended approach (see Gattegno 1972), Gattegno does many of the same sorts of things with commands that Asher recommends. It works very often, and Gattegno attributes this success to the teacher's silence. That is why he calls it the *Silent* Way.

At this point I would like to add that I think there is another explanation for the success of both these methods. While I respect the explanations offered by Dr. Asher and Professor Gattegno, I believe these methods both work because they make obvious to the student in the classroom the pragmatic correspondence between utterances in the target language and facts in the world of experience. This pragmatic connection or mapping relationship can be depicted as shown in Figure 1.

FIGURE 1
Pragmatic Mapping



Making this inferential linkage apparent to the language student is, I believe, the sine qua non of successful language teaching, the essential requirement. Actually I do not know that either Asher or Gattegno would accept this idea, but I must say that I think physical activity is incidental to TPR and that silence is incidental to the Silent Way.

But just what exactly is pragmatic mapping?

In the case of the three commands [$s^h{}_{\supset}s^hips^hiyo$]; [$torass^h{}_{\supset}s^hips^hiyo$]; [$anʃ\dot{i}s^hips^hiyo$] from the Asher lesson in Korean, and the three statements from the Gattegno lesson [$makt^+eki$]; [$noranmakt^+eki$]; [$p^+alganmakt^+eki$], the pragmatic mapping problem is for the students to determine what each command requires them to do, and for each statement what it means in reference to the artificial context defined by the different configurations of the rods. For instance, the student needs to discover eventually that [s^hips^hiyo] marks the verb in each case as a polite command. Further, the students will eventually refine their understanding so that they recognize [$s^h{}_{\supset}$] as the element designating the standing action, [$toras^h{}_{\supset}$] as meaning turn around and remain standing, and [$anʃ\dot{i}$-] meaning sit down. With respect to the Gattegno lesson, the students need to see that either one of these things (at this point, I held up the red and yellow rods) can be designated as [$makt^+eki$]; and that [noran] (holding up the yellow one) is an adjectival roughly translatable as yellow and that [p^+algan] (holding up the red one again) is an adjectival roughly translatable as red.

I can be more explicit about what pragmatic mapping is by exemplifying the process in respect to more subtle aspects of the acquisition of English as a first language. Consider the distinction between velar and alveolar points of articulation in English. This is not a contrast we ordinarily think of as having great pragmatic consequences. But the problem of relating such a subtle contrast in surface-form to the facts of experience may be a formidable one for a language acquirer. An anecdote will illustrate what I mean.

About a year ago, Mary Anne (my wife), Stephen (our son, then three years and two months), and I had been at the malls on a shopping errand—specifically

to buy a coat. The next weekend (about mid-March 1983) I was to leave for Wisconsin and needed an overcoat. Before hitting the malls we had gone to McDonalds to get a quick bite to eat. Stephen was seated in the back. When there was a suitable lull in the conversation he said, "I want my [k^ho?]."

Since it was a blustery evening, he already had his coat on and before I had buckled him in the back seat, I had very pointedly zipped it up. I said, "You have your coat on." This error was partly due to the fact that I had coats on the brain from the two hours of searching before finding one in the malls.

Exasperated he repeated his request. "No! Daggy, I want my [k^ho?]!"

On the second try his mother understood and handed him the root beer that was beyond his reach between the two bucket seats in front. (It didn't phase him that the thing had been sitting there for two hours while we were in the malls.)

At this point, I saw the opportunity to make a linguistics lesson out of the whole affair and seizing the opportunity, I said, "Oh. You mean you want your [k^hok^{hhhh}]."

"Yeah, Daggy, (k^hok^{hhhh}]," he repeated perfectly.

Until that time he had called me "Daggy" presumably on analogy with "doggie" which was one of his first words.

A few days later, I was telling the story to Jack Damico and discussing the implications for Krashen's monitor theory while Stephen was eating his peanut butter and crackers in the adjoining room. Stevie overheard the conversation with Jack and supplied the punch line at just the right juncture: "Yeah, Daggy, [k^hok^{hhhh}]!" This proved that he remembered the whole affair. Still later, after I returned from the trip to Wisconsin, Stephen greeted me on the way to the kitchen one morning with the remark, "I call you 'Daggy', huh, . . . but that's not real name, huh."

My curiosity was aroused. Having discussed with him a few days before the fact that although I called his mother Mary Anne, he should call her "Mommy." Then we had gone through all the names in the family. So I asked him. "Okay, Son, what's my real name?"

I expected him to say, "Your real name's 'John'."

Instead he said, "Your real name's 'Daddy'."

Apparently the incident with the "coat/coke" (alveolar/velar) contrast had precipitated a distinction between "Daggy/Daddy." In other words, the consciously motivated distinction in these phonemic features had generalized.

This anedote helps to explain what I mean by the process of pragmatic mapping. If viewed in the short term, it is the problem of comprehension, or of making one's self understood. If viewed over the long run, it is the problem of acquisition, refining one's proficiency and therefore one's communicative competence in the target language. The process, it would seem, is a delicate and a highly articulate one. Moreover, I am suggesting that the principal problem for language teachers is to find ways of facilitating this operation in the classroom.

Krashen and Terrell's *The Natural Approach*

Another method that Pat Richard-Amato and I included in our smorgasbord is the natural approach as advocated by Krashen and Terrell (1983; and Terrell 1982). Drawing heavily on a number of other sources but especially the work of Gattegno and Asher, Terrell and Krashen begin with comprehensible input

in the target language and build upon the limited comprehension attainable at the start always spiraling outward to a broader comprehension. They are always first and foremost engaged in making the pragmatic mapping of utterances to facts accessible to their students.

Their intention is to engage students in the enterprise of negotiating meanings in the target language from the first meeting onward and to build on the initial comprehension progressing toward native-like proficiency in the language. The idea is not really very different from that of Asher and Gattegno and may be represented as shown in Figure 2. In the figure, the area enclosed by the growing spiral may be construed as the growing proficiency in the target language while the left to right dimension represents the time over which this progress occurs. In this much, the three approaches examined have similar aims.

FIGURE 2
Growth in Comprehension and Proficiency



However, where Asher uses commands plus actions, and Gattegno uses statements about sticks (and later commands as well), Terrell and Krashen use statements, questions, negations, commands, and whatever contextual resources they can muster in a classroom context to support comprehension of these. They respect the desirability of an Asher-type "silent period" for some students and they reject the notion that overt correction of surface errors is helpful. They contend, and I tend to agree with them, that the focus of attention should be on meaning and truth-value more than on surface form. If a student says of Jane, "She girl with red hair," and in fact Jane does have red hair, the omission of the copula and of the definite article might be overlooked since the statement is factually correct. However, if a student says, "Jane is the girl with blond hair," where the surface form is fine but Jane's hair is red, this remark needs correction.

They also emphasize vocabulary expansion as the means to achieving syntactic maturity. Their argument is that if the words are available to express ideas, students will successfully discover the appropriate syntactic arrangements, while knowledge of syntactic patterns without lexical flesh and blood is like an embryo consisting only of a skeleton—a useless bag of bones.

Krashen and Terrell contend that the natural approach works because it simu-

lates, to some extent, the normal contexts of language acquisition. John Macnamara (1973) and Leonard Newmark (1966) had advocated doing this in language classrooms up to two decades ago. Of course, many would say that all of these authors are merely echoing what good language teachers have proved in centuries of experience, and as Terrell (1982) and others have frequently noted (among them, Alan Maley in his plenary at this conference – Solomon even wrote about it in the book of Ecclesiastes) there just aren't any new approaches under the sun. Still, I feel as Mari Wesche put it sometime ago in a letter, the natural approach is "a breath of fresh air" to language teachers – perhaps because of our feeling that it confirms what we already knew.

Dramatisation

A fourth approach, dramatization comes in several varieties. For instance, there is the *Rassias madness* advocated by disciples of a beloved lunatic at Dartmouth by the same name (see Wolkomir 1980; Johnston 1980; and Rassias 1970); *sociodrama*, as expounded for instance by Robin Scarcella (1978), or just *drama* as discussed by Susan Stern (1980); *scenarios and roles*, in the terms of Robert J. di Pietro (1981, 1982); and *role play* by Raymond Rodrigues and Robert White (1982). As proponents of dramatization we all share the belief that comprehension is critical to language acquisition and that acting out scenes, playing roles, inventing lines for a scenario, or even just rehearsing them may facilitate language acquisition. There is a lot of evidence to support these claims, and no longer can the critics beg off for lack of evidence.

The spirit of dramatic encounters is perhaps best expressed by John Rassias (1970) who mingles his verve for acting with some traditional audiolingualism to achieve some surprising success as a one man acting troop in the classroom. Of course, he has not always been sold on language teaching or teachers. He reports that once as a French student, a teacher depressed his tongue with a pencil to get him to say the French uvular "r". He said in an interview, "I couldn't help myself. I bit her." Discouraged by traditional language classrooms which he described as "valium valleys," he gave up language and went into acting. Later he returned to the classroom and brought his acting skills with him. Clearly, Rassias's approach to acting is not every teacher's, but the many uses of role-play and drama in the classroom reach far beyond the limits of the Rassias-type teacher-as-player.

Research has shown that students can be players too and that they benefit from practiced roles where the lines are written by someone else, and that they benefit even more in some cases by improvisations in scripts where some problem is posed and the student(s) must negotiate a solution. For instance, Di Pietro (1981 and 1982) suggests problems, presumably applicable for advanced students: (1) "Explain to your spouse how you had an accident with the new car," (2) "Apologize for not showing up for a date," (3) "Make up after an argument with your boy/girl friend," etc. (1983: 232).

However, one of the most developed approaches to dramatization that I have seen comes from Rodrigues and White (1982). They propose advance preparation for real-life scenarios. For instance, in getting ready for an actual trip to a grocery store they work through vocabulary, syntactic forms, and meanings in advance with their students through role-play. After a certain amount of ground

breaking activity, they actually take the students to a grocery store where they use some of their newly acquired skills in a real-life context. Afterward, the teacher may have a debriefing session back in the classroom where skills and knowledge are further refined. Again the model of spiraling growth of proficiency in the target language (Figure 2) seems appropriate.

A Pragmatic Curriculum

All of these methods, and in fact, I believe all other methods that really work may be construed as variants of elements within a pragmatic curriculum and I want to elaborate some more on this last idea as an integrated approach bringing together and making sense of many distinct "methods" of language instruction. As I said at the outset, this is a theoretical question, and I want to talk a little more about pragmatic theory before reaching a conclusion about why some methods work.

Pragmatics, as many of you know, is a branch of semiotics – the theory of signs, or the theory of symbolic systems. A few years ago when I had the audacity to use the term in a title for a talk in Vancouver, at breakfast I overheard some convention-goers talking through their programs. One of them said to a couple of others, "Good grief! What are they gonna think of next! What do you suppose 'pragmatics' means?"

"You got me," one of them answered.

"I don't know," said the third.

I breathed a piece of link sausage, gagged and sputtered and tried to hide behind my lecture notes, so they wouldn't recognize me later.

As a working idea, for language teachers the term "pragmatics" is only slightly more familiar these days than it was when I addressed a group of TESOLers on the subject in San Francisco at the invitation of John Upshur two sabbaticals ago (see Oller 1970). In more recent years the term has been used with many meanings and for most language teachers it still needs defining. It is derived from a Greek base which is related to our word "practical" in English. The same root formed the basis for the term "pragmatism" which is perhaps the only widely known and distinctly American brand of philosophy. In many ways that philosophy has also inspired the study of pragmatics – this is especially true in the many writings of C.S. Peirce, William James, and John Dewey.

Pragmatics in modern linguistic studies also goes by a variety of definitions, but I think it is ***the domain of language study, or of grammar, which is concerned with the relation between texts (including conversational and other manifestations of language) and facts*** – what I described earlier as the pragmatic mapping relation. In sum, I see the pragmatic hypothesis as a particular brand of the innatist hypothesis advocated by Chomsky.[1] The basic elements of the theory can be depicted as shown in Figure 3.

[1]Chomsky's claim is that a great deal of prior knowledge about the form of possible grammars of natural languages is possessed by all human infants before they start to acquire any particular language. For elaboration of this point, see especially the discussions in Piatelli-Palmarini (1980) and also in Lightfoot (1982) with a foreword by Chomsky.

FIGURE 3
Pragmatic Theory Barely Elaborated



At the deepest level (at the top of the diagram), I posit a general form of intelligence which ultimately makes possible the acquisition of the grammatical system of one or more natural languages, e.g., English, or Navajo, or Korean, etc. At the most superficial levels, one or more of these grammars may find representation in spoken, heard, written, and read forms – the surface manifestations of language. In addition, the same deep intelligence enables us to make sense of the facts of experience in general. That is, in some manner or other it allows us to understand what is going on around us through some sort of general logic of experience. In the diagram I call this logic simply L_{facts} to indicate that it is a logic (or language) of facts – a grammar which captures the propositional form of facts. Through the process of pragmatic mapping, this general logic of facts is linked up to the surface-forms of texts in a particular language via the universal and particular aspects of the grammar of the language in question. The idea is that human intelligence, through the medium of a known language, is able (somehow) to bridge the gap between the world of experience and the texts of that language. No less a scholar than Einstein (1956) – and others such as Immanuel Kant (1783) and C. S. Peirce (1877) – stressed the miraculous character of this bridging.

The basic premise of a pragmatic curriculum is the claim that the connection between texts and the facts of experience is the foundation both of comprehension and also of language acquisition in general and all of its concomitant skills including listening, speaking, reading, and writing. If we think of the immediate problem of comprehension on any particular occasion, the principal problem is to link up elements of the text with elements of experience – that is, pragmatic mapping. It involves such things as determining the referents of noun-phrases, pinning down verb phrases with respect to particular events at particular points

in time, distinguishing hypothetical statements from assertions, true statements from false ones, and in general, determining the experiential significance (or as William James called it, "the cash value") of all of the elements of the text. If this process is translated into the long term problem of making sense of texts in general, the process of linking texts to facts becomes the essence of language acquisition.

Therefore, if pragmatic theory is taken seriously, a language curriculum is one in which the world of experience (that is, the world of facts, the real world) is taken seriously. One of the things that has been learned from the traditional methods of language teaching that tend toward failure is that bathing students in utterances (or in texts) of the target language doesn't get us very far. If we take only the texts into account, and if we neglect their relation to the facts of experience, we inevitably run into serious trouble. On the other hand, success in language teaching depends on establishing in the mind of the student, largely at a subconscious level, the relationship between texts and facts. Krashen's emphasis on the need for comprehensible input – the so-called "input hypothesis" – is a natural consequence of pragmatic theory in just this sense. Also, such a theory can explain in a very straightforward manner the success of Asher's *total physical response approach*, Gattegno's *silent way*, the Terrell-Krashen *natural approach*, and the various approaches to *dramatization*. It can also explain the failure of approaches which leave the student in the dark indefinitely on the pragmatic relation between texts and facts in the target language.

But a pragmatic theory offers more. If we take the world of experience seriously, and pragmatic theory says we must, it becomes immediately apparent that the facts of experience do not appear randomly in the stream of consciousness. They ordinarily have at least two properties: first they *are generally vertical;* they correspond more or less faithfully to the real world – and second, they *appear in an orderly succession.*

Although some cultural anthropologists and skeptical philosophers have tried to argue that we all live in different universes, this idea is largely false. If it were not false, there would be no need bothering our heads about Russian bombs that are aimed at American cities, and the Russians would have no need of worrying about American missiles targeted on Russian cities. If we lived in different universes, there would be no problem. Also, the contrasts between the many cultures and the many belief-systems of the world would be unknowable if we all lived in different universes. On the contrary, cultural and other differences are important precisely *because* we live in the same real world, not in many different universes, but the same universe.

Also, contrary again to the well-meaning relativists – who have no association at all incidentally with Einstein (cf. his own collection of some of his writings copyrighted in 1956) who believed in the real world of real events, persons, relations, etc. – the succession of events in experience is not merely a function of a western European outlook. It is a necessary consequence of universal logic (as Kant showed two centuries ago) and of human physiology (as Lashley 1951 argued). Nor do illusions, misapprehensions, and breakdowns in perception create any insurmountable difficulties. In fact they are relatively easy to explain. It is the cases of correct understanding of facts in experience that present the greater difficulty to theories of knowledge and of language. That's why Einstein described this understanding as "a miracle." Or, as Immanuel Kant observed, the difficult

thing for a theory of epistemology is that experience is "valid knowledge of appearances and of their succession" where "the earlier can be conjoined with the later according to the rule of hypothetical judgments" (1783: 59). Kant insisted, and in this I think he was right, that "the human understanding is discursive" (1783: 104). That is, Kant advocated the textuality hypothesis (see Oller 1983)—the idea that experience itself is textual in character.

This idea can best be demonstrated by examples where the understanding goes awry or leads us into false expectations. Looking back to Figure 3, I should stress that what we are concerned with for the moment is the factual side of the pragmatic mapping process: the facts in the real world and their connections with each other, causal, spatio-temporal, inferential, implicational, presuppositional, associational, and the like.

Intelligent behavior, especially the generation of text, respects the logic of experience and also the fact that intelligent action is intrinsically goal-oriented. When Stephen asked for his coke, he did so because he wanted to drink it. The motivation for asking was chiefly the fact that he could not reach it from the back seat where he was buckled in. That is, being buckled in implied (in a propositional way) the fact that he would not be able to reach the coke. That is, it conflicted in an obvious way with his goal of drinking the coke, thus motivating his request (i.e., the generation of an appropriate text). Further, he assumed (in a propositional way again) that Mom or Dad would be willing to hand him the coke. This association (another proposition) resulted in some further conflict when in fact I did not understand what he wanted. I thought he was asking for his coat, which he already had on; hence, a conflict for me, and my comment (i.e., text), "You have it on."

In all of this we can say that the experiencer is an agent (in the grammatical, propositional sense of this term), acting on the basis of a plan (a kind of long term predicate, or verb phrase), moving toward some desired objective (a goal or direct object in some non-trivial grammatical sense). Thinking gets going; communication becomes critical; and text generation is motivated at just the point where the conflict enters. The need for further communication ceases at the point where the conflict is suitably resolved, and/or the goal is achieved. That is to say, normal text is typically episodically organized in two fundamental senses. First, it is logically structured: it consists of propositions which are logically related to each other and to similar logical connections between facts in the world of experience. Second, it is motivated, usually by some sort of meaningful conflict. The conflict need not be sword-play or a gun-fight, but it will always involve some "doubt" as C.S. Peirce (1877) would have described it, some "trouble" or "predicament" in the terms of John Dewey (1916), or some "disequilibrium" as Piaget (1947) might have put it.

The fact that human intelligence depends in a large measure on the two aspects of episodic organization just defined can be illustrated best by examples where intelligence fouls up. Actually, if things run smoothly intelligence is usually quite invisible—the invisible logic of orderly experience (or the invisible God who created the visible universe, as Peirce, and others have argued). However, when things go wrong, intelligence is suddenly apparent, even in subtle aspects of its functions—e.g., as in the example of the "coat/coke" confusion, or the "Daggy/Daddy" case.

The logical aspect of episodic organization can be illustrated best by texts

which violate that logic. For instance, my favorite example which shows quite graphically what happens when the ordinary logic of experience (L_{facts} in Figure 3) is radically violated comes from the nineteenth century humorist Samuel Foote. It seems that he had been attending a series of lectures by a certain pedagogue who claimed to have mastered the art of memory so thoroughly that he could repeat from rote any passage of prose up to 100 words in length after having read it only once. At the end of the talk, Foote presented the pompous lecturer with the following text and asked him to read it aloud to the audience and then demonstrate his superior memory skills:

> So she went into the garden to cut a cabbage leaf to make an apple pie: and at the same time a great she-bear coming up the street pops its head in the shop. "What! No soap!" So he died, and she very imprudently married the barber: and there were present the Picninnies, the Joblillies, and the Garcelies, and the Great Panjandrum himself, with the little round button at the top, and they all fell to playing the game of catch-as-catch-can till the gunpowder ran out the heels of their boots (Foote ca. 1854, as cited by Cooke 1902: 221f).

This text is a lot like Chomsky's example sentence, "Colorless green ideas sleep furiously." Of course, the text about the she-bear was written about three-quarters of a century before transformational linguistics. The pompous lecturer who had boasted of his memory skills was unable to repeat it after only one reading. Foote's demonstration showed clearly that memory depends in a large part on the logical structure of experience and that texts which fail to respect that logic are difficult to recall.

A secondary aspect of the usual episodic organization of texts is motivation. To the extent that a text has pragmatic point it is usually in reference to some basic conflict. That is, the text itself serves to reveal the resolution of the conflict, the re-balancing of some imbalance, the equilibration of some disequilibrium, the resolution of doubt in Peirce's terms, or the removal of trouble or difficulty in Dewey's terms. Otherwise, if there is no conflict, no doubt, no disequilibrium, the text itself will seem unmotivated.

Examples of unmotivated texts are fairly easy to find in ESL/EFL materials. For instance, from *English for Today* authored by a committee of the National Council of Teachers of English (1973), consider the episode involving Mr. and Mrs. Miller (p. 73). They are on their way to Hong Kong and just happen to run into the same stewardess they had met on an earlier flight. We don't know why they are going to Hong Kong, but the important thing is that Miss Yamada, the familiar stewardess, takes out her picture album and begins to show them photos of her friends and family. Miss Yamada says, "This is my best friend. Her name is Fumiko."

"She's very pretty," comments Mrs. Miller. "Is she older or younger than you?"

"She's one year younger."

"Aren't you thinner than she is?" Mrs. Miller probes.

"Yes, I am. Fumiko loves to eat."

Mr. Miller pats his tummy and puts in, "So do I. I hope it will be time for lunch soon" (NCTE 1973: 73).

Now here is the question: why wouldn't we be apt to write home about this episode? Can't you just see the letter?

Dear Mom,

Today we learned about Miss Yamada and the Millers. At Mrs. Miller's probing, Miss Yamada admitted that her best friend Fumiko is overweight. Mr. Miller, who also apparently overindulges, was glad it would be lunch time soon. Isn't that interesting?

Love,
-mo
Mohammed

The reason that we probably would not write home about the Miller episode is that it lacks motivation. There is no conflict to motivate any of the questions or answers. It also lack logical structure. Why, for instance, does Mrs. Miller ask about the relative ages and weights of Miss Yamada and Fumiko? Is the photograph that bad, or is the contrast that noteworthy? Neither of these possibilities seems likely. Rather, we may suppose that Mrs. Miller is an English teacher of the old school who wants to check out Miss Yamada's understanding of comparative constructions—an esoteric motive at best.

Of course, the *English for Today* series is now more than a decade old, and it was a considerable improvement on the Lado-Fries type of drill material where totally disjointed sentences were common: "Is the alphabet important?" "Is the doctor available?" "Is the secretary busy?" "Is the television on?" and the like, and the Lado-Fries materials were in some ways superior to the word-for-word translation approaches common still earlier. All of these curricula have their merits, and someone may contend that we have come a long way since then. No one could dispute this. Substantial gains have been made.

One only has to compare this year's publishers exhibits to those of a decade ago to see evidence of progress. However, even in the decade of the 1980s, in materials which have benefited from the notional/functional revolution of recent years and the swing toward communicative approaches, we still find materials that lack episodic structure and motivation.

For instance, here are three examples from three sets of materials: First, from *Workbook 1* of the *In Touch* series (Castro, Kimbrough, and Zane 1983) published by Longman, we find the following exchanges between a young man and a young woman:

1. A: Where's room 310?
   B: It's ___on___ the third floor ___next to___ the elevator.
2. A: Excuse me, where's the telephone?
   B: It's ___on___ the second floor ___between___ the stairs and the elevator.
3. A: Is there a Ladies' Room on this floor?
   B: Uh-huh. It's ___across___ from the elevator.
4. A: Where can I find a drinking fountain?
   B: There's one ___next to___ the Men's Room.
5. A: Excuse me. Where's Room 202?
   B: It's ___on___ the second floor, ___next to___ the secretary's office (1983: 31).

Now, without looking back, where's the telephone?

Why is it so hard to remember this sort of thing? Precisely because the text itself lacks episodic organization. There was no reason for us to want to know where the telephone was, nor the Ladies' Room, nor Room 202, or even the drinking fountain. Stranger still is the fact that the woman asking for the Ladies' Room is pictured practically looking at the door marked "Ladies' Room." But in spite of all its weaknesses, this series of dialogues is superior in many respects to the sort of thing characteristic of the Lado-Fries era. The *In Touch* series offers ingenious illustrations for almost every utterance to help establish meaning – the pragmatic mapping relationship.

A second example comes from another attractive program, *Spectrum*, published by Regents (Warshawsky, Byrd, Veltfort, and Vaughn 1982). Here is a phone conversation from the first book:

Jim: Hello?

Sam: Hello, Jim? This is Sam.

Jim: Hi, Sam. How are you?

Sam: Okay. Listen, what are you doing?

Jim: Oh, watching TV. How about you?

Sam: I'm just reading the newspaper. Listen, do you want to see a movie in Chicago?

Jim: Chicago? It's too far away.

(We almost expect him to say, "What the heck, why not New York, or Singapore?")

Sam: Too far? It only takes 35 minutes by train.

Jim: I don't really like Chicago. Everything costs too much.

Sam: Then let's go to a movie around here.

Jim: Okay. That's a good idea (1982: 101).

Then, of course, they hang up.

A third example comes from another widely used communicatively oriented series known as *American Streamline* published by Oxford University Press (Hartley and Viney 1983). Here's a dialogue, or actually a series of them that appear early in the first book:

A: Hello.
B: Hello.
A: I'm David Clark.
B: I'm Linda Rivera.

(Now we cut to another pair of interlocutors)

C: Are you a teacher?
D: No, I'm not.

(D is being coy, apparently. If C had asked, "Do you know what time it is?" presumably D would have answered, "Yes, I do." But C is persistent and continues.)

C: Are you a student?

(Bingo! He hits the jackpot on the second try.)

D: Yes, I am.
(Cut to another pair.)
E: Are you from the United States?
F: No, I'm not.
E: Where are you from?
F: I'm from Canada.
(Cut to yet another pair.)
G: Hello, Kenji.
H: Hi, John. How are you?
G: Fine, thanks. And you?
H: Fine, thanks (1983: 3-4).

In spite of the fact that the characters seem uncooperative and perhaps a bit aimless, the colorful illustrations depict them as sophisticated modern people, and they are very attractive indeed. What would make the program even better would be to make an even more radical commitment to the logic of experience and the avoidance of textual sequences that lack motivation.

But where do such unmotivated texts come from? Why have these otherwise excellent series incorporated such strange sequences? Actually, one popular theory which may contribute to the development of such texts, is what is known as the notional/functional syllabus. For example, concerning the function of "asking for permission," L. Jones (1977) recommends:

> Sometimes we need to do more than just offer to do something—we may need to ask permission to make sure we are allowed to do it. The expression to use depends on: (a) the type of task you want to do and the degree of resistance you anticipate; (b) who you are and who you are talking to—the role you are playing and your status.
>
> Here are some useful ways of asking permission. They are graded in order of politeness:
>
> I'm going to leave early.
> I thought I might leave early.
> I'd like to leave early.
> All right if I leave early?
> Anyone mind if I leave early? . . . (1977: 223)

But imagine Clint Eastwood as Dirty Harry saying between clenched teeth, "Anyone mind if I leave early?" Actually, I do not think the so-called "grading" of these "useful ways of asking permission" would hold up under close scrutiny.

Then for practice Jones recommends:

> Make a list of five things you would like to do, but which would need your teacher's permission. Ask for permission to do them—but be warned, he may ask you why! Later he will change roles and play the role of the principal, so you may then need to change the way you ask (1977: 223).

Okay, we're mostly native speakers of English, let's give it a shot. Dr. An-

thony (Edward Anthony of Pittsburgh, seated on the front row), go ahead. You start. Ask me permission. Be dramatic.

. . . .

Obviously something is wrong. Something critical is missing. Actually, what is missing is the requisite *episodic organization*. In fact there are two aspects of episodic organization that are missing: the first is *structure* (which may be construed as the cognitive basis). Where is the learner going to go? Why does he need my permission? On what basis could I possibly object to his going? What is his motivation for going there? What is my motivation for regulating his going there? These are some critical elements that are missing. Moreover, without them, the game seems rather pointless. This sort of classroom game cannot be construed as role playing because the roles are not well defined. It isn't dramatization because there is no story, play, or plot. In short, it isn't English. It's borderline nonsense. Pragmatic mapping isn't just difficult in such a situation; it is impossible until some of the missing elements are supplied. Of course they usually are in actual practice, but this is no help to the *theory* of the notional/functional syllabus.

A pragmatic curriculum differs from a notional-functional syllabus chiefly because in *pragmatic theory* we take the world of experience seriously. Because of this we do not ask students to either invent or imitate and then practice many different ways of apologizing, asking permission, etc. They may practice such acts, but only in contexts where the notions and functions in question arise in the natural course of events, the same as certain types of syntactic structures, lexical items, phonological contrasts, and so on arise naturally.

For example, consider the episode from the second lesson of *La Familia Fernández* (Oller, Sr. 1963; and also see Oller, Sr., and Oller, Jr. 1983) where Pepito wants to go with his older brother, Emilio, and Emilio's friend, Enrique:

> Pepito runs after them asking, "¿Adónde van? ¿Adónde van ustedes?" (Where are you going?)
>
> Annoyed, Emilio waves him off saying, "¡No te importa!" (It's none of your business.)
>
> Pepito begins to shout in the direction of the house, "¡Mamá! ¡Mamá! ¿Adónde van Emilio y Enrique?"
>
> "¡Cállate!' ¡Cállate.! Pepito," (Shut up! Shut up!) says Emilio and then he bends down to Pepito's level in a conciliatory manner and says, "Vamos a nadar." (We're going swimming.)
>
> Enrique too, willing to be helpful says, "Si, vamos a nadar."
>
> "¿Puedo ir? ¿Puedo ir con ustedes?" (Can I go? Can I go with you?) Pepito asks with eyebrows raised and a hopeful look.
>
> Emilio frowns. "No. No puedes." (No. No you can't).
>
> Pepito starts yelling again, "¡Mamá! ¡Mamá! ¿Puedo ir con Emilio y Enrique?"
>
> "Cállate, cállate," (Quiet down. Quiet down.) Emilio looks at Enrique who reluctantly nods. "Bueno, bueno. Puedes ir." (Okay, okay. You can go.)
>
> Pepito starts walking along with them and then suddenly, he pauses, wrinkles his nose and says, "No. No quiero ir. Voy a jugar con mi perro."

(Naw. I don't wanna go. I'm gonna play with my dog.) (Oller, Sr. 1963: 9 or Oller, Sr. and Oller, Jr. 1983: 30)

What's different here? Pepito is doing the very sort of thing that Jones (1977) was talking about with reference to the notional/functional approach: he is asking permission. Why is it that Pepito's request seems meaningful while the other exercise seems so empty? The difference is episodic organization. In Pepito's case, there is a reason for him to want to tag along and there is a reason for Emilio to want to prevent Pepito's going along. A meaningful (though minor) conflict ensues. Because of these facts, the text is both logical and motivated. On the other hand, both of these aspects are unfortunately missing when we are told simply to ask someone permission for something out of the blue. In fact, the whole world of experience is missing in the latter case. Or, putting it differently, the facts are missing, or at least undetermined. In ordinary communication this is not the case. The facts are usually fixed, or determined to a large extent. For this reason, I believe that there is literally *a world of difference* between the notional/functional syllabus (with all of its merits) and a pragmatic curriculum.

Summing up, pragmatic theory suggests that we should *not* ask students to invent and practice many different ways of apologizing, asking permission, refusing an offer, etc. In a pragmatic curriculum, they may perform these communicative acts, but only in meaningful contexts where the notions and functions in question arise in connection with the natural course of events. In the same way, certain types of syntactic structures, lexical items, phonological contrasts, and so forth arise naturally in the same contexts. The person who was the world's best-selling author at least until 1981, put it like this: he said, the elements of a story (or in fact any conversation, or text in the most general sense) should be "perfectly logical" (Erle Stanley Gardner as cited in Fugate and Fugate 1980: 79).

What Is Different about *Methods that Work?*

Finally we return to the basic question where we started out. *Methods that Work* (or "families of methods" would be more accurate) require students to link up utterances in the target language with facts which are in some sense present (that is fixed or established)—either actually in the case of the *total physical response*, the *silent way*, and the *natural approach*, or at least they are imagined or portrayed in film or drama as in the various approaches to *dramatization*, or in a *pragmatic curriculum*. We may say that *in all of the Methods that Work, the main objective is to establish the pragmatic linkage between facts and texts in the target language*. Pragmatic theory suggests further that this linkage will be easier to establish, that texts will be of greater benefit to our students, to the extent that they are *episodically organized*—logically structured and motivated by conflict.

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